“Lord Abinger (William F. Scarlett, 3d Baron Abinger, Lt. Col. Scots Fusilier Guards) and group at headquarters, Army of the Potomac” (Library of Congress).

In this letter to his wife Meade sums up his opinions on Hooker and the Battle of Chancellorsville. It is, to say the least, an unfavorable view of Fighting Joe. Meade also talks a bit more about the visit of Lord Abinger. He often had to deal with foreign visitors who came to America with a view to observing military operations.

The battle of Chancellorsville was a miserable failure, in which Hooker disappointed me greatly. His plan was admirably designed, and the early part of it, entrusted to others, was well executed; but after he had assembled his army on the other side near Chancellorsville, instead of striking at once vigorously and instantly, before the enemy, who were surprised, could concentrate, he delayed; gave them thirty-six hours to bring up and dispose of their troops; permitted them to attack him, and after their doing so, failed to take advantage of their error in dividing and separating their forces, but allowed them to engage only about half his army and to unite their forces after driving back a portion of ours. He then assumed the defensive, doing nothing for two days, while we could hear Sedgwick’s guns, and knew they were trying to crush him and must succeed. Finally he withdrew to this side, giving up all the advantages gained, and having to recross with all the obstacles and difficulties increased.

Notwithstanding these are my views, I have abstained from making them known to any one, out of consideration for Hooker, who has always pretended to be very friendly to me. I declined to join Couch in a representation to the President, when he was down here, and I refused to join Slocum, who desired to take action to have Hooker removed. I told both these gentlemen I would not join in any movement against Hooker, but that if the President chose to call on me officially for my opinions, I would give them. I have spoken to no one but Governor Curtin, and to him only because he came to see me and spoke so freely and bitterly against Hooker, that I allowed myself to say a part of what I have above written. I considered my conversation with Governor Curtin private, and did not expect he would repeat it or quote me. I have seen Senators Wade, Chandler, Wilson and Doolittle, all of whom have been down here to find out what they could, but I have abstained from saying anything, as they did not think proper to ask me any questions. Hooker is safe, I think, from the difficulty of finding a successor, and from the ridiculous appearance we present of changing our generals after each battle. He may, and I trust he will, do better next time; but unless he shows more aptitude than in the last affair, he will be very apt to be defeated again. Lee committed a terrible blunder in allowing us to come back; he might have destroyed us by a vigorous attack while we were retreating.

The review of my corps passed off very well yesterday, and Lord Abinger expressed himself greatly pleased. After the review I had a collation at my quarters, which seemed to be equally pleasing to his lordship. He said that if he had time to stop in Philadelphia, he would hunt you up.

Turnbull, who was at the review, showed me a few lines he had received from Proctor Smith, by a flag of truce that went after the wounded. Smith is Chief Engineer on Lee’s staff. He begs to be remembered to you and me. Beckham is major of artillery and commands a battery with Stuart’s cavalry. Smith is colonel.

Meade’s letter taken from The Life and Letters of George Gordon Meade, Major-General United States Army, Vol. 1, (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1913), pp. 379-80. Available via Google Books.

Meade wrote his letter  of May 17, 1863 to his oldest son, John Sergeant. We hear more about his son George than we do of John Sergeant, mainly because the eldest son’s health kept him out of the military. Over the next year and a half Meade’s letters home to his wife will become increasingly concerned about John Sergeant, because the boy suffered from tuberculosis and would suffer declining health until his death in February 1865.

There is nothing specially new here. We have lost many men by the casualties of the recent battle, and many more since by reason of the expiration of service. In the meantime, the enemy have been largely reinforced from the army recently on the Blackwater. Under these circumstances I don’t see how we can advance without additional troops, and as yet I do not hear of any coming. Still, the talk is that we are to move very soon. Yesterday I went to see General Stoneman and Lieutenant Colonel Smith, to thank them for their kindness to George, which I did, and said a great many fine things on the part of your mother. Stoneman said he was afraid George would have considered him rough and harsh, as he had to change him in a dark, rainy night from a buggy to a wagon, in a great hurry, and had to speak very sharply. I told him that George remembered nothing but his exceeding kindness.

Meade’s letter taken from The Life and Letters of George Gordon Meade, Major-General United States Army, Vol. 1, (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1913), pp. 376-7. Available via Google Books.

This photograph is titled “Removing wounded across Rappahannock River after battle of Chancellorsville – under flag of truce” (Library of Congress).

This analysis of the repercussions of Chancellorsville bears a small load of historical irony. Meade writes that Hooker “has on this occasion missed a brilliant opportunity of making himself,” which is what Meade’s critics would be seeing after Lee army escaped over the Potomac following Gettysburg. I have to assume that son George’s presence with Stoneman’s cavalry blinded the father to the fact that Stoneman did not perform well at all. In fact, the cavalry’s rather feeble efforts provided one reason why Hooker’s campaign failed. (Young George Meade played a limited role at Chancellorsville, having fallen ill with a severe case of measles.)

Meade’s meeting with Pennsylvania governor Andrew Gregg Curtin will have repercussions later. Meade was free with his criticisms of Hooker when he spoke with the governor and Curtin indiscreetly reported the conversation in Washington, which soon got back go Hooker.

“Forney’s Press” is a reference to the Philadelphia Press, published by John Wien Forney. “During the war, Forney spent most of his time in Washington performing his duties as Secretary of the Senate; entertaining celebrities in his commodious quarters at the Mills House on Capitol Hill; giving some attention to supervising a newspaper property which he had founded there; and contributing letters to the Press under the pseudonym of ‘Occasional,’” noted J. Cutler Andrews in The North Reports the Civil War.

I did not suppose you would credit the canard in the papers about our crossing and Lee’s retreating. This story, however, with minute details, I see is published in Forney’s Press, an Administration organ, that must have known and did know better. It has been circulated for some purpose, and is doubtless considered a great piece of strategy. There is no doubt Hooker assured the President that he would soon cross again and repair all disaster, but I fear he finds the execution of this promise more difficult than the making. The enemy have all returned to their old positions and they have been seen to-day busily engaged throwing up dirt and strengthening all the crossings by additional works, though one would suppose, from the work they had previously executed, there was no room for more.

To-day I had a visit from Governor Curtin. The Governor is very much depressed, and I tried to put him in better spirits.

I cannot write you fully in relation to all the recent operations. All I can say is that Hooker has disappointed the army and myself, in failing to show the nerve and coup d’ceil at the critical moment, which all had given him credit for before he was tried. It is another proof of what a sense of responsibility will do to modify a man’s character, and should be a warning to all of us to be very cautious how we criticise our neighbors, or predict what we would do ourselves if placed in similar circumstances. My only fear is that Hooker, goaded by the attacks that are now made on him, may be induced to take some desperate step in the hope of retrieving his waning fortunes. At the same time, as I have already told you, he was fully aware when he ordered the withdrawal of the army, that he was running the risk, and great risk, of self-sacrifice. For he said he knew his personal interests were involved in advancing. I believe he acted sincerely, and for what he considered the interests of the army and the country, but I differed with him in judgment, and I fear events will confirm my view. I was clearly in favor of tempting the hazard of the die, and letting Washington take care of itself. I am sorry for Hooker, because I like him and my relations have always been agreeable with him; but I cannot shut my eyes to the fact that he has on this occasion missed a brilliant opportunity of making himself. Our losses are terrible; they are said to exceed fifteen thousand men, greater than in any other battle or series of battles, greater than in the whole of the celebrated six days’ fighting before Richmond, and greater than McClellan’s Maryland campaign. This large loss, together with the loss of over twenty thousand nine-months’ and two-years’ men, will very materially reduce this army, and unless it be speedily reinforced will paralyze its movements.

Stoneman’s success was very complete, and his whole operation brilliant in the extreme. The enemy acknowledge he has beaten Stuart, and that the latter’s laurels are faded. Alas, that we should not have taken advantage of his success! As it is, before we can advance or press them back, they will have repaired all the damages Stoneman inflicted on them.

Meade’s letter taken from The Life and Letters of George Gordon Meade, Major-General United States Army, Vol. 1, (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1913), pp. 374-5. Available via Google Books.

Did Meade really believe there was no possibility that the Administration might elevate him to command of the Army of the Potomac? Perhaps he truly did.

Darius Couch, who commanded the II Corps at Chancellorsville did, in fact, say he would not serve under Hooker. He received command of the Department of the Susquehanna, with headquarters in Harrisburg, Pennsylvania. The traces of fortifications, hastily thrown up on hills on the opposite side of the Susquehanna from Harrisburg and named Fort Couch, still remain in the town of Lemoyne. The Camp Curtin Historical Society and Civil War Round Table erected a fine monument there a few years ago.

Darius Couch, who had had enough of Joe Hooker (Library of Congress).

There is a great deal of talking in the camp, and I see the press is beginning to attack Hooker. I think these last operations have shaken the confidence of the army in Hooker’s judgment, particularly among the superior officers. I have been much gratified at the frequent expression of opinion that I ought to be placed in command. Three of my seniors (Couch, Slocum and Sedgwick) have sent me word that they were willing to serve under me. Couch, I hear, told the President he would not serve any longer under Hooker, and recommended my assignment to the command. I mention all this confidentially. I do not attach any importance to it, and do not believe there is the slightest probability of my being placed in command. I think I know myself, and am sincere when I say I do not desire the command; hence I can quietly attend to my duties, uninfluenced by what is going on around me, at the same time expressing, as I feel, great gratification that the army and my senior generals should think so well of my services and capacity as to be willing to serve under me. Having no political influence, being no intriguer, and indeed unambitious of the distinction, it is hardly probable I shall be called on to accept or decline. I see the papers attribute Hooker’s withdrawal to the weak councils of his corps commanders. This is a base calumny. Four out of six of his corps commanders were positive and emphatic in their opposition to the withdrawal, and he did it contrary to their advice. Hooker, however, I should judge, feels very secure, and does not seem concerned. I have no idea what his next move will be. For my part it would seem that all projects based on pursuing this line of operations having been tried and failed, we should try some other route. Yet the Administration is so wedded to this line that it will be difficult to get authority to change.

Meade’s letter taken from The Life and Letters of George Gordon Meade, Major-General United States Army, Vol. 1, (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1913), pp. 373-4. Available via Google Books.