Defending Meade (December 12, 1863)

Theodore Lyman defends his boss. As time passes it becomes more certain that Meade will remain in command of the Army of the Potomac. I do not know who he means by his reference to the “Hon. Kellogg,” but the quote Lyman credits to him does remind me of something from a letter Meade wrote back in December 20, 1862, just after the Battle of Fredericksburg.It is understood [General in Chief Henry] Halleck says: ‘This army shall go to Richmond, if it has to go on crutches,’ which (as over ten thousand cripples were made the other day) seems likely to occur before long.”

I still think, and more strongly than ever, that no change will be made in our chief command; and those who have been to Washington think the same. I am more and more struck, on reflection, with General Meade’s consistency and self-control in refusing to attack. His plan was a definite one; from fault of his inferiors it did not work fast enough to be a success; and he had firmness to say, the blow has simply failed and we shall only add disaster to failure by persisting. By this time the officers here know just about how well the Rebels fight, and what we have a reasonable expectation of taking, and what not. It should be remembered, also, as a fundamental fact, that this line is not approved as a line of operations, and never has been; but we are forced to work on it. Those who think that (according to the Hon. Kellogg) “it would be better to strew the road to Richmond with the dead bodies of our soldiers rather than that there should nothing be done!” may not be content; but those who believe it best to fight when you want to, and not when your enemy wants to, will say simply they are sorry nothing could be effected, but glad that there was no profitless slaughter of troops that cannot be replaced.

Theodore Lyman’s letter is from Meade’s Headquarters, 1863-1865: Letters of Colonel Theodore Lyman from the Wilderness to Appomattox, p 61. Edited by George R. Agassiz. Boston, Massachusetts Historical Society, 1922. Available via Google Books.

Continuing Silence (December 11, 1863)

In this image taken at Cold Harbor in 1864, Winfield Scott Hancock (seated) poses with (left to right) Francis Barlow, David Birney, and John Gibbon. Prior to Ulysses S. Grant's promotion to general-in-chief, Birney had supported efforts to get Joe Hooker returned to command of the Army of the Potomac (Library of Congress).

Two officers Meade mentions in his December 11 letter appear in this image taken at Cold Harbor in 1864. Winfield Scott Hancock (seated) poses with (left to right) Francis Barlow, David Birney, and John Gibbon. Prior to Ulysses S. Grant’s promotion to general-in-chief, Birney had supported efforts to get Joe Hooker returned to command of the Army of the Potomac (Library of Congress).

Time passes and still Meade hears nothing from Washington after his failed Mine Run Campaign. As he frets, Meade speculates about potential successors. Joe Hooker, of course, was his predecessor as commander of the Army of the Potomac and there was a movement afoot to have Fighting Joe return to command. Thomas is George Thomas, who had received the nickname of “The Rock of Chickamauga” after his stand at that September battle helped prevent the complete rout of William Rosecrans’ army. Gibbon is John Gibbon, who commanded a division of the II Corps (and at times the entire II Corps) at Gettysburg. Winfield Scott Hancock had been the II Corps commander when not in charge of other corps as well as his own. Like Gibbon, he had been wounded on the third day at Gettysburg.

I have not heard a word from Washington, but from what I see in the papers, and what I hear from officers returning from Washington, I take it my supersedure is decided upon, and the only question is who is to succeed me. I understand the President and Secretary Chase are very anxious to bring Hooker back; but Halleck and Stanton will undoubtedly oppose this. A compromise may perhaps be made by bringing Thomas here, and giving Hooker Thomas’s army.

I have very kind letters from Gibbon and Hancock, both hoping I will not be relieved, and each saying they had not lost a particle of confidence in me. Many officers in the army have expressed the same feeling, and I really believe the voice of the army will sustain me. This, though, goes for nothing in Washington. I will not go to Washington to be snubbed by these people; they may relieve me, but I will preserve my dignity.

Meade’s correspondence taken from The Life and Letters of George Gordon Meade, Major-General United States Army, Vol. 2, (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1913), pp. 160-1. Available via Google Books.

Dissatisfaction (November 3, 1863)

This image, taken in September 1863 outside Culpeper, shows Meade with several of his generals. From left to right we have Gouverneur Warren, then in temporary command of the II Corps while Winfield Scott Hancock recovered from his Gettysburg wound; William French, commanding the III Corps; Meade; Henry Hunt, the army's artillery chief, chief of staff Andrew Humphreys; and George Sykes (V Corps).

This image, taken in September 1863 outside Culpeper, shows Meade with several of his generals. From left to right we have Gouverneur Warren, then in temporary command of the II Corps while Winfield Scott Hancock recovered from his Gettysburg wound; William French, commanding the III Corps; Meade; Henry Hunt, the army’s artillery chief, chief of staff Andrew Humphreys; and George Sykes (V Corps).

In his letter home on November 1, Meade remains defensive about his recent operations. He knew that President Lincoln and General in Chief Henry Halleck were not happy with the results, but he felt they should remove him from command if they thought someone could do better. Yet when he did propose a plan of action—an attempt to flank Lee’s army by crossing the Rappahannock at Banks Ford and Fredericksburg—Lincoln refused permission. Perhaps Meade’s projected strategy aroused bad memories of Ambrose Burnside’s disastrous campaign, but almost certainly the president worried that the movement risked leaving Washington exposed. It’s interesting to speculate, though, what would have happened had the Army of the Potomac been in Fredericksburg in the spring of 1864 instead of having to fight its way through the Wilderness.

Within the army rumor had it that Meade was going to be replaced. “Candidly, we feel every confidence in Meade, and if anyone succeeds him but McClellan, the dissatisfaction will be intense,” noted one officer.

There is no doubt my failure to engage Lee in battle during his recent advance created great disappointment, in which feeling I fully shared. I have seen and heard of no indications of absolute dissatisfaction, though this may have existed without its being manifested. The General in Chief did telegraph me I had better fight instead of running away, but as he did not explain how I could fight to advantage, I paid no attention to the very rough manner in which he expressed his views, except to inform him that, if my judgment was not approved, I ought to be and deserved to be relieved; to which I received no reply beyond a disclaiming of any intention to give offence. Now I have clearly indicated what I thought feasible and practicable and my plan is disapproved. I think under these circumstances justice to me and the true interests of the country justify their selecting some one else to command.

Meade’s correspondence taken from The Life and Letters of George Gordon Meade, Major-General United States Army, Vol. 2, (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1913), p. 155. Available via Google Books.

Have you read Searching for George Gordon Meade: The Forgotten Victor of Gettysburg yet? If not, you can buy it here!

A Capital Visit (October 23, 1863)

The United States Capitol as it appeared on June 28, 1863, coincidentally, the day that Meade received command of the Army of the Potomac. William Franklin, under whom Meade had served at Fredericksburg, had been the engineer in charge of the new dome construction before the war (Library of Congress).

The United States Capitol as it appeared on June 28, 1863, coincidentally, the day that Meade received command of the Army of the Potomac. William Franklin, under whom Meade had served at Fredericksburg, had been the engineer in charge of the new dome construction before the war (Library of Congress).

In which General Meade describes a summons to Washington. His laconic account in this letter to his wife is not terribly informative. Fortunately we have Theodore Lyman to fill in the details (and add, it must be said, a taste of the casual racism that would have been considered perfectly normal in the nineteenth century but grates against twenty-first century sensibilities). I’ve included Lyman’s letters from both October 23 and 24 here.

Yesterday I received an order to repair to Washington, to see the President. I arrived in Washington at 2 P. M., and expected to leave at 6 P. M., but was detained so late that I remained there all night, and left this morning, early. The President was, as he always is, very considerate and kind. He found no fault with my operations, although it was very evident he was disappointed that I had not got a battle out of Lee. He coincided with me that there was not much to be gained by any farther advance; but General Halleck was very urgent that something should be done, but what that something was he did not define. As the Secretary of War was absent in Tennessee, final action was postponed till his return.

Here’s Lyman’s much more expansive account:

Major General John Sedgwick. His men called him "Uncle John." (Library of Congress)

Major General John Sedgwick. His men called him “Uncle John.” (Library of Congress)

And where do you think I was all yesterday? I will tell you. Early, the orderly, poked his head into the tent saying: “Colonel Lyman, the General will have breakfast at seven” (which was an hour earlier than he had said the night before). As soon as I sat down, says the General: “I am going to Washington; would you like to go?” . . . Major-General Humphreys said he too would go, and the General’s son George completed the party. In much haste I ran, and crammed my best coat, pantaloons, shoes, sash, gauntlets, and brushes into my big saddle-bags, the which I entrusted to a mounted orderly. Thereupon we speedily got on horseback, and first rode to General Sedgwick (familiarly called “Uncle John”), to whom General Meade handed over the command, in his absence at Washington, to consult about the late moves and those consequent on them. Uncle John received the heavy honors in a smiling and broad-shouldered style, and wished us all a good journey, for he is a cheery soul. With little delay, we again mounted and rode twelve miles, briskly, to Gainesville, whither the railroad comes. The Chief stepped into a little room, used as a telegraph-office, and, quicker than winking, he stood, arrayed only in his undergarments; then, before, almost, I could get my coat off, he had put on a pair of shoes, a new coat, and an elegant pair of trousers! “Now then, Lyman, are you ready? Where’s Humphreys? Humphreys is always late! Come, come along, the train is going to start!” You should have seen the unfortunate Aide — his coat unbuttoned, his shoestrings loose; on one arm the saddle-bags, on the other, his sword, sash, etc., etc., and he hastening after the steam-engine Meade! However I completed my toilette in the car, which was all to ourselves; and flatter myself that my appearance was considerably peacock. We went rattling and bumping over a railroad that reminded me of the one from Civita Vecchia, to Manassas Junction, and thence to Washington, over a route I have already described to you when I came down. Only this time we came through Alexandria, and, instead of taking there a boat, kept on and went across the long bridge, going thus into the very city by the rail. There was a carriage from Willard’s awaiting us; the guardpost near by turned out in our honor, and we drove in great state to General Halleck’s office; where General Meade went in and held a solemn pow-wow; the two came forth presently and walked over to the White-House, where they held another pow-pow with the President. Captain George and I, meanwhile, studied the exterior architecture, and I observed a blind had been blown off and broken and allowed to lie outside. In fact they have a nigger negligence, to a considerable extent, in this half-cooked capital.

October 24, 1863

We went to Willard’s after the pow-pow and got a very good dinner; only poor General Meade was bored to death and driven out of all peace of mind, by dirty politicians who kept coming up and saying: “Ah, General Meade, I believe; perhaps you do not recollect meeting me in the year 1831, on a Mississippi steamboat? How do you do, sir? What move do you propose to execute next? Have you men enough, sir? What are the intentions of Lee, sir? How are the prospects of the rebellion, sir? Do you look upon it as essentially crushed, sir? Or do you think it may still rear its head against our noble Union, sir?” etc., etc. All of which the poor Chief (endeavoring to snatch a mouthful of chicken, the while) would answer with plaintive courtesy; while the obscure aides-de-camp were piling in all kinds of delicacies. . . . The papers say General Meade received imperative orders to give Lee battle; not a word of truth in it! You might as well give imperative orders to catch a sea-gull with a pinch of salt. Lee would perhaps have given us a chance; but the same storm that prevented our advance carried away the Rapidan bridge, and he could get nothing to eat. His forces were, I think, larger than supposed, especially in cavalry, which was very numerous.

Meade’s correspondence taken from The Life and Letters of George Gordon Meade, Major-General United States Army, Vol. 2, (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1913), p. 154. Available via Google Books.

Theodore Lyman’s letter is from Meade’s Headquarters, 1863-1865: Letters of Colonel Theodore Lyman from the Wilderness to Appomattox, pp. 36-8. Edited by George R. Agassiz. Boston, Massachusetts Historical Society, 1922. Available via Google Books.

 Have you read Searching for George Gordon Meade: The Forgotten Victor of Gettysburg yet? If not, you can buy it here!

An Army in Motion (October 19, 1863)

Brig. Gen. John Buford (Library of Congress).

Brig. Gen. John Buford (Library of Congress).

There’s no letter from Meade for October 19, but once again Theodore Lyman steps into the breach to provide a detailed account of the Army of the Potomac during what became known as the Bristoe Campaign. The “Rebel regiment of horse” he mentions was none other than Jeb Stuart, who had found himself trapped between two sections of Meade’s army late on October 13. He spent the night hidden in some woods a mere 400 yards from a division of the II Corps, opened up with his horse artillery in the morning, and then escaped.

Lyman also mentions one of the Union’s best cavalrymen, John Buford. When he first encountered Buford, Lyman described him as “a compactly built man of middle height, with a tawny moustache and a little, triangular gray eye, whose expression is determined, not to say sinister. His ancient corduroys are tucked into a pair of ordinary cowhide boots, and his blue blouse is ornamented with holes; from one pocket thereof peeps a huge pipe, while the other is fat with a tobacco pouch. Notwithstanding this get-up he is a very soldierly looking man. He is of a good-natured disposition, but not to be trifled with.”

The attack on Warren’s rear that Lyman mentions is the Battle of Bristoe Station. “Poor Paul Revere” was the grandson of the famed midnight rider. He had been killed at Gettysburg. The 20th Massachusetts was also known as “the Harvard Regiment.”

Lyman also provides a good look at Meade and the general’s gunpowder disposition. Nothing ticked him off more than wagon trains blocking the army’s progress, as Lyman describes here.

The bracketed portion of the text is how it appears in Meade’s Headquarters.

It seems to me I had got to Sunday morning, the 11th, when we began to march back. We started from Headquarters and passed through Brandy Station, forded the Rappahannock, close to the railroad, and took up our camp near the railroad and about two miles from the river. . . . This move, though in the wrong direction, was, without question, a good one, as it bothered the enemy and caused them to hesitate. … In the morning we got off about ten (for the General does not mount till he has heard that the army is properly under way) and rode along the north side of the railroad, past the camp I first came to (H.Q. near Warrenton Junction), and so to Catlett’s Station, where we found the 1st Corps taking their noon rest; also their chief, General Newton, and General (Professor) Eustis, partaking from a big basket. A spy came in also, who gave such information as showed that the Rebels had made less rapid progress than we supposed. Going a mile or two on, we saw a spectacle such as few even of the old officers had ever beheld; namely, 2500 waggons, all parked on a great, open, prairie-like piece of ground, hundreds of acres in extent. I can compare it to nothing but the camp of Attila, where he retreated after the “Hun Schlacht,” which we saw at the Berlin Museum. They were here got together, to be sent off to the right, by Brentsville, to Fairfax Station, under escort of General Buford’s division. How these huge trains are moved over roads not fit for a light buggy, is a mystery known only to General Rufus Ingalls, who treats them as if they were so many perambulators on a smooth sidewalk! We turned off to a house, two miles from Catlett’s, and again pitched our movable houses, on a rocky bit of a field. . . .

At daylight next morning, every corps was in motion, tramping diligently in the direction of the heights of Centreville, via Manassas Junction. We of the Staff had hardly dressed, when there was a great cracking of carbines in the woods, not a mile off, and we discovered that a Rebel regiment of horse had coolly camped there during the night, and were now engaged with our cavalry, who soon drove them away. Pretty soon the sound of cannon, in the direction of Auburn, announced that the Rebels, marching down from Warrenton, had attacked General Warren’s rear. He, however, held them in check easily with one division, while the other two marched along, passing our Headquarters at 9.30 A.m. As they went on, I recognized the Massachusetts 20th, poor Paul Revere’s regiment. And so we jogged, General Meade (who has many a little streak of gunpowder in his disposition) continually bursting out against his great bugbear, the waggons; and sending me, at full gallop, after General Sykes, who was a hundred miles, or so, ahead, to tell him that the rear of his ambulance train was quite unprotected. . . . The 15th was employed in feeling the intentions of the enemy and resting the exhausted men. On the 16th came on a deluge of rain which spoiled our contemplated move next day. On the 18th, yesterday, we got some information of reliable character for the first time, viz: that they had torn up the railroad and were falling back on Warrenton. Before that there was every kind of report: that they were going up the Shenandoah Valley; marching on Washington, and falling back on Richmond; and they keep so covered by cavalry, that it is most difficult to probe them. Thus far in the move they have picked up about as many prisoners as we, say 700; but we have the five guns and two colors, they having none. To-day we all marched out at daylight, and are now hard after them, the General praying for a battle. Our cavalry has been heavily engaged this afternoon, and they may make a stand, or indeed, they may not. I think I was never so well and strong in my life. General Buford came in to-day, cold and tired and wet; “Oh!” said he to me, “do you know what I would do if I were a volunteer aide? I would just run home as fast as I could, and never come back again!” The General takes his hardships good-naturedly.

[The result of the manoeuvres brought the army toward Washington, which caused uneasiness and dissatisfaction at the Capitol. “At Centreville,” writes Lyman, “we had a set-to between Meade and Halleck. Meade had asked, by telegraph, for some advice, and stated that he was not sufficiently assured of the enemy’s position to risk an advance; so conflicting were the reports. Halleck, apparently after dinner, replied in substance, ‘Lee is plainly bullying you. If you can’t find him, I can’t. If you go and fight him, you will probably find him!’ General Meade, much offended, prepared a reply in some such words as these: ‘If you have any orders, I am ready to obey them; but I must insist on being spared the infliction of such truisms in guise of opinions as I have recently been favored with. If my course is not satisfactory, I ought to be and I desire to be relieved.’ He had written ‘bunsby opinions,’ and consulted me as to whether it would do; to which I replied that the joke was capital, but not in accordance with the etiquette of a commander-in-chief; so he substituted the other. Poor General Meade! Said he, ‘I used to think how nice it would be to be Commander-inChief; now, at this moment, I would sooner go, with a division, under the heaviest musketry fire, than hold my place!’“ Lee, finding that he could not outflank Meade, fell back, and Halleck apologized.]

Theodore Lyman’s letter is from Meade’s Headquarters, 1863-1865: Letters of Colonel Theodore Lyman from the Wilderness to Appomattox, pp. 33-6. Edited by George R. Agassiz. Boston, Massachusetts Historical Society, 1922. Available via Google Books.

Have you read Searching for George Gordon Meade: The Forgotten Victor of Gettysburg yet? If not, you can buy it here!

From Centreville (October 17, 1863)

Alfred Ward titled this drawing "General Warren fighting at Bristoe Station." Warren and the II Corps gave the Confederates a bloody nose during the battle on October 14, 1863 (Library of Congress).

Alfred Ward titled this drawing “General Warren fighting at Bristoe Station.” Warren and the II Corps gave the Confederates a bloody nose during the battle on October 14, 1863 (Library of Congress).

On October 17 Meade wrote to his wife from Centreville, Virginia. He had pulled the Army of the Potomac back to his position in reaction to Robert E. Lee’s attempt to flank him. Here’s a little of what I wrote about the campaign in Searching for George Gordon Meade: The Forgotten Victor of Gettysburg:

[General in chief Henry] Halleck wasn’t happy about Meade’s “retrograde” movements or his complaints about his inability to obtain accurate information about the enemy’s whereabouts. “Lee is unquestionably bullying you,” he telegraphed Meade on October 18. “If you cannot ascertain his movements, I certainly cannot. If you pursue and fight him, I think you will find out where he is. I know of no other way.”

“If you have any orders to give me, I am prepared to receive and obey them,” Meade snapped back, “but I must insist on being spared the infliction of such truisms in the guise of opinions as you have recently honored me with, particularly as they were not asked for.” When drafting this message Meade had initially used the words “bunsby opinions,” a reference to a character in Charles Dickens’s Dombey and Son who was noted for his baffling advice. Before sending it he asked Lyman if he thought that was the best choice of words. [Theodore] Lyman didn’t. He advised “that the joke was capital, but not in accordance with the etiquette of a commander-in-chief.” They decided to use “truisms” instead.

During all the movements to and fro, it was Lee’s army that suffered the only serious punishment. The encounter took place near Bristoe Station on the Orange and Alexandria Railroad. It happened on October 14 when Gen. A. P. Hill’s forces made a rash attack on what they thought was the Army of the Potomac’s rear guard as the Union army moved north. Had Hill taken the time to adequately reconnoiter, he would have discovered that Warren’s II Corps was still nearby.

Lee made a desperate effort to get in my rear, but I succeeded in out-manoeuvring him, and got into position at this place, Centreville, with my back to Washington, and ready for his attack if he had chosen to make it. This is the third day we have been here and he has not come forward; I am trying to find out where he now is. If he is near me I shall attack him, but I fear that, failing in his manoeuvre, he is either going back, or going up into the Valley of the Shenandoah, where I shall have to follow him.

Meade’s correspondence taken from The Life and Letters of George Gordon Meade, Major-General United States Army, Vol. 2, (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1913), pp. 153-4. Available via Google Books.

If you haven’t already purchased Searching for George Gordon Meade: The Forgotten Victor of Gettysburg, why not buy it now?

Meetings in Washington (September 24, 1863)

In his letter of September 24, Meade tells his wife about the events that led to the XI and XII Corps being taken from his army and sent to reinforce the Army of the Cumberland under Maj. Gen. William Rosecrans in Chattanooga following the Union defeat at Chickamauga. (The administration also sent Joe Hooker with the two corps, answering the question of what to do with Meade’s predecessor in command.) This move cost the Army of the Potomac some 16,000 men.

Secretary of War Edwin Stanton (Library of Congress).

Secretary of War Edwin Stanton (Library of Congress).

The last time I wrote I told you of my having referred to Washington the question of a further advance. As I expected, no decisive answer was sent to me, but I was told to act in accordance with my own judgment. The next thing I was summoned to Washington and informed that the President considered my army too large for a merely defensive one, and proposed to take a portion of it away. I objected and reasoned against this, and left Washington with the belief that the President was satisfied. I had just arranged the programme for a movement, and was about issuing the orders, when orders came from Washington, taking troops away. Of this I do not complain. The President is the best judge of where the armies can be best employed, and if he chooses to place this army strictly on the defensive, I have no right to object or murmur. I was in Washington from 11 p. M. Tuesday till 1 p. M. Wednesday; saw no one but the President, Mr. Stanton and General Halleck; was treated very courteously by all. I told the President and General Halleck that if they thought I was too slow or prudent, to put some one else in my place. Halleck smiled very significantly, and said he had no doubt I would be rejoiced to be relieved, but there was no such good luck for me. I cannot very well tell you all that transpired; the intelligence, by no means favorable, had been received from Rosecrans, and it was evident, without any one knowing what exactly might or could be done, that there still existed a feverish anxiety that I should try and do something. Now that I have been weakened, I presume the country will not be so exigeante.

Theodore Lyman, Meade’s aide, wrote home on the same day. It’s interesting to see things from his perspective:

Yesterday we were favored with the presence of Sir Henry Holland, the Queen’s physician, who is one of the liveliest old birds for one of seventy-five that ever was seen. He travels two months every year, and has already been four or five times in these United States. Dr. Letterman, the Medical Director, put him in an ambulance, and Colonel Townsend and myself completed the party. What pains wounded people may suffer in ambulances, I know not; but I do know that, when driven at a trot, over open fields and through little ditches, the jolting is not to be expressed in words. But the royal medical person maintained his equanimity wonderfully and continued to smile, as if he were having a nice drive over a turnpike. First he was halted on a rising spot, when he could see four batteries of horse artillery, which did defile before him, to his great admiration. Then we bumped him six miles farther, to the Headquarters of the 12th Corps, close to the river. Here he hobnobbed with General Slocum, and then got on a horse and rode about the camps. After which he was taken to a safe spot, whence he could behold the Rebels and their earthworks. He returned quite fresh and departed in a most amiable mood.

There seems to me no particular prospect of a battle. I thought this morning, that we should have a great fight within a couple of days; but movements, which I dare say you will read of in the papers before this letter reaches you, have just knocked it. Entre nous, I believe in my heart that at this moment there is no reason why the whole of Lee’s army should not be either cut to pieces, or in precipitate flight on Richmond. In saying this to you, I accuse nobody and betray no secrets, but merely state my opinion. Your bricks and mortar may be of the best; but, if there are three or four chief architects, none of whom can agree where to lay the first brick, the house will rise slowly.

Meade’s correspondence taken from The Life and Letters of George Gordon Meade, Major-General United States Army, Vol. 2, (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1913), pp. 150-1. Available via Google Books.

Theodore Lyman’s letter is from Meade’s Headquarters, 1863-1865: Letters of Colonel Theodore Lyman from the Wilderness to Appomattox, pp. 21-2. Edited by George R. Agassiz. Boston, Massachusetts Historical Society, 1922. Available via Google Books.

The Hooker Problem (August 6, 1863)

The Union had an interesting problem during the war: What to do with former commanders of the Army of the Potomac? George McClellan was in exile in New Jersey, eventually to emerge as the Democratic candidate for president. Ambrose Burnside had been packed off to the Department of the Ohio and would eventually return to command of the IX Corps and serve under Meade—to the benefit of neither. Now the question was, what to do with Joe Hooker?

I think I told you confidentially that Halleck had ordered me to halt and cease pursuing Lee, that I had given my judgment against the measure, but had been over-ruled. I do not know the reason.

The other day, as you saw in the papers, I pushed my cavalry forward, which alarmed them (the enemy), so that Lee immediately withdrew all his infantry behind the Rapidan. I am quite sure if I was to advance now, he would fall back to Richmond. What I fear from the delay is that he will recruit faster than I, for, from all I can gather, I fear our draft will prove a perfect failure, and that the few men it does produce will be worthless, and will desert the first opportunity. As the question never will be settled till their military power is destroyed, I think it unfortunate we do not take advantage of their present depression to push them as far as possible.

I think I told you that the President wrote me privately, to know if I would object to Hooker being assigned to a corps under me, and that I answered, no. To-day I have a private letter from _______ written undoubtedly at Halleck’s instigation, saying it is reported Hooker is to be sent, provided I apply for him, and urging me strongly not to do so, on the ground that he will go to work to get up cliques against me, and to demoralize my army. I have written to _________ exactly what has occurred, and said that though my relations with Hooker would not justify me in objecting to his being ordered, yet I had no idea of applying for him, and I did not think either Hooker or his friends could or would expect me to do so. It would be very difficult for Hooker to be quiet under me or any one else, and I sincerely trust some independent command will be found for him, and that it will not be necessary to send him here.

(Hooker did not rejoin the Army of the Potomac. He was sent out West, along with the XI and XII Corps, and fought well at Chattanooga. Hooker later became the focus of various machinations to have him replace Meade as commander of the Army of the Potomac, but nothing came of it. )

Meade’s correspondence taken from The Life and Letters of George Gordon Meade, Major-General United States Army, Vol. 2, (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1913), pp.141-2. Available via Google Books.

Meade’s Repy to Halleck (July 31, 1863)

On July 31 Meade wrote two letters, one to his wife and one to General-in-Chief Henry Halleck. The one to his wife comes first, followed by the letter to Halleck, which is his reply to Halleck’s letter of July 28.

I enclose you two letters recently received—one from the President to General Howard, who thought it proper to write to Mr. Lincoln, deprecating his dissatisfaction with me, and informing him I had the full confidence of the army. The other is from General Halleck, written voluntarily and without any particular call that I know, unless he has had repeated to him something that I have said. His letter is certainly very satisfactory, and places the matter, as I have replied to him, in a very different light from his telegram. Disappointment was a feeling natural to every one, and was fully shared in by myself. It could have been entertained without implying censure, but dissatisfaction implied a failure on my part, which I repudiated at the time and since. I have answered Halleck in the same spirit as his letter, thanking him for his kind feeling and good opinion, and explaining my position, and stating that personal considerations aside, I hope that whenever the President thinks I am wanting, or has another whom he deems better suited, I trust he will at once put me aside.

I see by the Richmond papers that Lee denies we had any fight at Falling Water, or that I captured any organized body of prisoners. He has been misinformed and it will be easy to prove the truth of my despatches.

Meade to Halleck:
Headquarters, A. P., July 31, 1863. (Unofficial.)
Major-general Halleck, General-in-Chief.

My Dear General: I thank you most sincerely and heartily for your kind and generous letter of the 28th inst., received last evening. It would be wrong in me to deny that I feared there existed in the minds both of the President and yourself an idea that I had failed to do what another would and could have done in the withdrawal of Lee’s army. The expression you have been pleased to use in a letter, to wit, a feeling of disappointment, is one that I cheerfully accept and readily admit was as keenly felt by myself as any one. But permit me, dear General, to call your attention to the distinction between disappointment and dissatisfaction. The one was a natural feeling in view of the momentous consequences that would have resuited from a successful attack, but does not necessarily convey with it any censure. I could not view the use of the latter expression in any other light than as intending to convey an expression of opinion on the part of the President, that I had failed to do what I might and should have done. Now let me say in the frankness which characterizes your letter, that perhaps the President was right. If such was the case, it was my duty to give him an opportunity to replace me by one better fitted for the command of the army. It was, I assure you, with such feelings that I applied to be relieved. It was, not from any personal considerations, for I have tried in this whole war to forget all personal considerations, and I have always maintained they should not for an instant influence any one’s action. Of course you will understand that I do not agree that the President was right—and I feel sure when the true state of the case comes to be known, however natural and great may be the feeling of disappointment, that no blame will be attached to any one. Had I attacked Lee the day I proposed to do so, and in the ignorance that then existed of his position, I have every reason to believe the attack would have been unsuccessful and would have resulted disastrously. This opinion is founded on the judgment of numerous distinguished officers, after inspecting Lee’s vacated works and position. Among these officers I could name Generals Sedgwick, Wright, Slocum, Hays, Sykes, and others.

The idea that Lee had abandoned his lines early in the day that he withdrew, I have positive intelligence is not correct, and that not a man was withdrawn until after dark. I mention these facts to remove the impression which newspaper correspondents have given the public: that it was only necessary to advance to secure an easy victory. I had great responsibility thrown on me: on one side were the known and important fruits of victory, and on the other, the equally important and terrible consequences of defeat. I considered my position at Williamsport very different from that at Gettysburg. When I left Frederick it was with the firm determination to attack and fight Lee without regard to time or place as soon as I could come in contact with him. But, after defeating him and requiring him to abandon his schemes of invasion, I did not think myself justified in making a blind attack, simply to prevent his escape, and running all the risks attending such a venture. Now, as I said before, in this perhaps I erred in judgment, for I take this occasion to say to you, and through you to the President—that I have no pretensions to any superior capacity for the post he has assigned me to—that all I can do is to exert my utmost efforts and do the best I can; but that the moment those who have a right to judge my actions think or feel satisfied either that I am wanting, or that another would do better, that moment I earnestly desire to be relieved, not on my own account, but on account of the country and the cause. You must excuse so much egotism, but your kind letter in a measure renders it necessary. I feel, General, very proud of your good opinion, and assure you I shall endeavor in the future to continue to merit it. Reciprocating the kind feeling you have expressed, I remain, General, most truly and respectfully yours,

George G. Meade, Major-General.

Meade’s correspondence taken from The Life and Letters of George Gordon Meade, Major-General United States Army, Vol. 2, (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1913), pp. 137-8 and 139-41. Available via Google Books.

Letter from Halleck (July 28, 1863)

Major General Henry Halleck, a.k.a. "Old Brains."

Major General Henry Halleck, a.k.a. “Old Brains.” (Library of Congress)

On July 28 general-in-chief Henry Halleck wrote Meade an unofficial letter to clarify his and the president’s reactions to Lee’s escape after Gettysburg.

I take this method of writing you a few words which I could not well communicate in any other way. Your fight at Gettysburg met with universal approbation of all military men here. You handled your troops in that battle as well, if not better, than any general has handled his army during the war. You brought all your forces into action at the right time and place, which no commander of the Army of the Potomac has done before. You may well be proud of that battle. The President’s order of proclamation of July 4th showed how much he appreciated your success. And now a few words in regard to subsequent events. You should not have been surprised or vexed at the President’s disappointment at the escape of Lee’s army. He had examined into all the details of sending you reinforcements to satisfy himself that every man who could possibly be spared from other places had been sent to your army. He thought that Lee’s defeat was so certain that he felt no little impatience at his unexpected escape. I have no doubt, General, that you felt the disappointment as keenly as any one else. Such things sometimes occur to us without any fault of our own. Take it all together, your short campaign has proved your superior generalship, and you merit, as you will receive, the confidence of the Government and the gratitude of the country. I need not assure you, General, that I have lost none of the confidence which I felt in you when I recommended you for the command.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,
H. W. Halleck.

Halleck’s letter taken from The Life and Letters of George Gordon Meade, Major-General United States Army, Vol. 2, (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1913), pp. 138-9. Available via Google Books.